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ra
ct The growth of “global cities” in the 1980s was sup-posed to have involved an occupational polarization,
including the increase in low-paid service jobs.
Although held to be untrue for European cities at the
time, some such growth did emerge in London a
decade later than first reported for New York. The
question is whether there was simply a delay before
London conformed to the global city model or
whether another distinct cause was at work in both
cases. This article proposes that the critical factor in
both cases was actually an upsurge of immigration
from poor countries that provided an elastic supply of
cheap labor. This hypothesis and its counterpart
based on the growth in elite jobs are tested econo-
metrically for the British case with regional data
spanning 1975–2008, finding some support for both
effects, but with immigration from poor countries
as the crucial influence in late 1990s London.
67
EC
O
N
O
M
IC
G
EO
G
R
A
PH
Y
90(1):67–90.
©
2013
C
lark
U
niversity.
w
w
w
.econom
icgeography.org
Increased inequality in labor market outcomes
during the past 30 years has been a subject of note,
concern, and academic investigation in a number of
advanced economies, notably the United States and
the United Kingdom. In much of the academic litera-
ture, the issue of interest has been that of widening
earnings differentials across occupations (and some-
times industries), often seen in terms of changing
returns to particular components of human capital
(increasing returns to “skills” or, more specifically, to
educational qualifications). The dominant approach
to explaining this situation has been in terms of shifts
in the demand-supply balance for these assets, driven
by a demand for upskilling, stimulated by some com-
bination of technological change and reinforcement
of patterns of comparative advantage by increasingly
globalized economic competition. An alternative
approach has emphasized structural changes in the
context of the determination of pay, within increas-
ingly deregulated labor market institutions—itself
perhaps a response to intensified competition and
these market forces, but one mediated in different
ways by national political and social systems and the
established power of labor unions (Bound and
Johnson 1992).
Within the more neoclassical (supply-demand)
accounts of this change, shifts in the occupational
distribution—generally seen as one toward more
sophisticated high-skill jobs—play an important
intermediate role. Their direct compositional effects
on the aggregate distribution of earnings or incomes
has been of less interest, although on some plausible
assumptions (if technological change were particu-
larly biased toward the elimination or deskilling of
intermediate jobs, à la Braverman 1974), they may
have led to a significant increase in the variance, as
well as to an upward shift of the whole distribution. A
number of studies have suggested, however, that the
occupational structure of advanced economies may
actually be polarizing, in the sense that the share of
the least well-rewarded jobs may be increasing as well
as that of the most rewarded types.
This hypothesis was first advanced by sociologists
and political economists in the context of debates
about an emerging postindustrial–post-Fordist
economy (Bell 1973; Pahl 1988; Sassen 1991). More
systematic evidence of this pattern was subsequently
presented by labor economists (Goos and Manning
2007 for the United Kingdom; Autor, Katz, and
Keaney 2006 for the United States). The key obser-
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vation was that the least well-paid jobs were typically to be found in activities with (more
or less) untradable products, notably personal services and construction, which could not
as readily be offshored to cheap labor economies, in accordance with comparative
advantage, and might not have been readily merchandisable because of some barriers to
standardization. Urban sociologists and geographers tended to focus on the former,
pointing to the service nature of these jobs as requiring face-to-face contact and thus
geographic proximity between the high-income consumers and the low-paid producers.
Labor economists tended to focus on the latter and to base their analysis on a
nonmonotone impact of technological progress. In particular, Autor, Levy, and Murnane
(2003) distinguished between routine tasks that are substitutable by technology and
nonroutine tasks that are not, while Goos and Manning (2007) pointed to the concen-
tration of nonroutine tasks at the two ends of the pay spectrum (e.g., among professionals
and cleaners) as a cause of polarization. Recent work has combined the two approaches,
relating the growth of employment in the lowest paid occupations to the rising demand
by affluent and time-poor consumers for personal services that are both untradable
and unmerchandisable (Manning 2004; Mazzolari and Ragusa 2007; Kaplanis 2007,
2010a).
The global cities thesis (originated by Friedmann and Wolff 1982 and Sassen-Koob
1984) linked this phenomenon specifically to concentrations of the higher echelons of
the service class (i.e., those in professional and managerial occupations) in global
command and control centers such as New York and London. Sassen (1991) claimed
empirical support from analyses of the development of key global cities during the
1980s. But this claim was vigorously contested in relation to European centers by
urban geographers and sociologists, who contended that the observable trend in the job
mix was simply one of professionalization, not polarization (Hamnett 1994; Buck
1997; Buck et al. 2002).
A decade later, however, there were indications, for London at least, that some such
occupational polarization might have belatedly been emerging (Buck et al. 2002).
Indeed, whereas at the UK level, a trend toward polarization was evident throughout
the 1980s and 1990s (Goos and Manning 2007), in London this only clearly emerged
within the 1990s, but then proceeded more vigorously than in the rest of the country
(Kaplanis 2007). Econometric analyses suggested a causal association between the
growth of jobs in the top and bottom quintiles of the occupational distribution
(Kaplanis 2010a, 2010b) as implied by the global city thesis—although the timing was
problematic since both globalization and rapid growth in the service class in London
seemed as evident in the 1980s as in the 1990s. To account for the reported break in
trends toward polarization in London between these decades and for the apparent dis-
crepancy between trends in New York and London in the 1980s (as reported by Sassen
and Buck/Hamnett respectively) requires another hypothesis. The one that we propose
and investigate in this article is that the actual growth in employment in the bottom
segment of jobs is conditional on the availability of an elastic supply of cheap labor,
which was afforded—in New York from the 1980s on, but only more recently in Lon-
don—by the emergence of large-scale immigration from low-wage economies to these
cities in particular (Buck et al. 2002; Hamnett 1996). Recognition of an association
between these phenomena is not new, having been emphasized by Sassen (1991). But
whereas Sassen saw increased immigration simply as a consequence of the demands
for personal services from an expanding elite in the global cities, our hypothesis is that
exogenous boosts to immigration (from policy and crises elsewhere) were necessary
causal factors for a growth in low-wage service employment to be secured in these
economically pressurized cities.
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The impact of international migration on wages and employment has been a matter for
intense study and debate among labor economists (since Card 2001 and Borjas 2003). A
key issue has been the distribution of the skills of migrant workers and how it is related
to that of native workers (Dustmann, Glitz, and Frattini 2008). Low-skill migrants, who
have been perceived as making up most of the upsurge in immigration to the United
Kingdom from the 1990s onward, would be expected to compete mainly with low-skill
natives and thus have an asymmetrical effect on the wage distribution. In the lower tail
of the skill distribution there should be a downward shift in wages, engendering some
growth in employment, while productivity spillovers could induce an increase in the
wages of those higher up the distribution—with an unclear overall effect on the average
wage. Indeed, evidence has shown a modest negative effect on the wages of low-skilled
workers and a positive effect on the wages of high-skilled workers (Ottaviano and Peri
2008; Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth 2006; Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston
2008).
Skill as such may not be the critical factor, however, particularly if it is defined in
relation to formal qualifications. Our approach in this article starts instead from a simple
ordering of occupations in terms of pay rates (for a benchmark time and area) to
represent the hierarchy of sublabor markets into which migrants are inserted. Our thesis
is that rather than being intrinsically “low skilled,” most recent migrants to the United
Kingdom have a substantial skill potential (and formal qualifications), but that initially
those coming from poor countries get crowded into the bottom rungs of the occupational
ladder (see Table 1). The reasons for this situation are various—ranging from language
problems through the nonrecognition of qualifications to discrimination. But the effect is
that many highly educated immigrants downgrade, in terms of occupation at least, upon
their arrival in the country before they start to climb back to positions that are consistent
with their capacities (Gordon, Travers, and Whitehead 2007). According to this inter-
pretation, there should be an identifiable association between depressed wages in bottom-
tier jobs and recently high levels of in-migration (from poor countries)—rather than from
a longer-term accumulation of (intrinsically) low-skilled migrant workers. And the
growth in jobs associated with the provision of local services, should reflect the elastic
labor supply that new migrants provide—not just a growth of the potential demand for
such services from an expanding elite of money-rich time-poor professionals in global
city roles.
In this article we address these hypotheses by investigating demand and supply-side
influences on the evolving occupational profile of employment in British regions via a
Table 1
London Employment by Type of Migrant Type and U.K. Pay Quintiles (Percentages), 2008
Origin of Migrants
Years in the
United Kingdom
Bottom
Quintile
Second
Quintile
Third
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
Top
Quintile
All
Jobs
Nonmigrant — 11.3 16.0 17.4 24.0 31.3 100
High-wage countries 0–3 13.5 11.6 10.2 24.3 40.5 100
>3 9.5 12.6 9.8 24.3 43.8 100
Low-wage countries 0–3 40.5 19.7 9.0 9.1 21.7 100
>3 23.9 21.3 17.7 17.3 19.8 100
Source: Labour Force Survey data from the online Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS).
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panel model of earnings and employment dynamics for quintile1 segments of jobs during
the years 1976–2008. The model is initially set up in simple supply-demand terms, with
wages in each segment potentially influenced by international migration and employment
levels responding to these wages as well as to exogenous demand factors. Uneven
impacts from the introduction of a national minimum wage (NMW) during the period are
controlled for. The scale and earnings of the top segment are included in the demand
equations for lower segments; interdependences between earnings in neighboring seg-
ments are allowed for; autocorrelation across segments is handled through estimation
with 3SLS; and spatial interdependences are explicitly investigated. Results from these
interregional analyses are then applied to the explanation of what happened to lower-tier
jobs in London during the late 1990s and whether their growth then was due mostly to an
influx of rich (global city) consumers or of poor migrant workers.
Theory
The conceptual background to this simple equilibrium model may be sketched in
terms of an economy consisting of two economic sectors, three types of labor, a number
of internal regions, and an external region with substantially lower wages that serves both
as a trade and migration partner. One sector produces a mix of tradable goods and
services for intermediate and final demand; the other produces only services for private
consumers that cannot be traded because personal contact is required. The service sector
is taken to be less amenable to capital-labor substitution because of this type of contact.
In the traded sector, demand is assumed to depend both on price and quality, whereas in
the nontraded sector, it is determined by a combination of price, local real incomes, and
sociodemographic influences on tastes and on the opportunity cost of self-servicing. The
three types of labor are professional, routine, and low skilled, with high, medium, and
low levels of human capital, respectively.
The internal regions are distinguished in terms of centrality and thus in the potential
for agglomeration economies. But these effects are taken to apply primarily to the
professional jobs in the traded sector because of the role of exchanges of tacit knowledge
for workers with high human capital in quality-sensitive activities (Graham 2009).
Within the traded sector (only), production may be functionally disaggregated across
regions (and/or internationally). At the regional scale, there are thus effectively three
independent trading sectors, each employing just one type of labor, as well as a local
service sector employing all three types.
Wages are set competitively at the regional scale, but with spillovers between both
regions and occupations. The strength and rapidity of interregional spillovers depend on
both proximity and the relative mobility of occupational groups (varying positively with
their levels of human capital). Although subject to external shocks affecting competi-
tiveness in the traded sector and driving the flow of international migrants, real wage
levels (adjusted for differences in the cost of living) are assumed to converge strongly,
although never fully equalized for the low-skill group. Differences in money wages
remain, however, because of the inelastic supply of space (for residences and untraded
services) in the most central region.
Migrants from the (poor) external region are assumed to settle disproportionately in
the core region and to have a distribution of (general) levels of human capital levels
mirroring that in the host economy—but to take time acquiring those specific assets that
1 Defined on the basis of national earnings and employment shares observed at a reference date, with the
actual share of employment in each quintile varying both over time and across areas.
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allow access to skilled or professional jobs (Wills et al. 2010). In the context of nationally
inflexible wages in these occupations, in times of recession, new migrants may be joined
in competing for unskilled jobs by others who have been “bumped down” from skilled
employment (Reder 1964).
Although there are gaps in this sketched specification of the economy, it has a number
of evident implications. In particular, as spatial divisions of labor are facilitated, they
imply a pattern of specialization in which the home economy as a whole comes to
concentrate solely on professional and skilled activities, plus an inescapable segment of
unskilled jobs within the untradable service sector, while the core region (whether
formally global or not) specializes solely in professional occupations, with only a residue
of skilled or unskilled jobs in that untradable sector. Overall, growth in the home
economy should be focused on professional jobs, implying a more rapid overall growth
(both in jobs and money incomes) within the core region and the likelihood (because of
space constraints) that residence costs at least will rise there. And, in turn, whether local
employment in such jobs is sustained or even grows would seem to depend both on the
“luxury” (high-income and low-price elasticity) character of the demand for untradable
services—the essence of the global city hypothesis—and on the extent to which external
migration to the core region keeps unskilled wages down.
In this article, we investigate the significance of (one, the other or both) these factors
for the shifting pattern of change in employment in the bottom segment of the labor
market (where untraded services now clearly predominate) across British regions. On the
demand side, we look both at the potential impact of employment and earnings in the top
group of jobs and at that of induced changes in household structure. On the supply side,
we focus on the impacts of recent international migration: first on relative earnings in the
bottom group of occupations and then (indirectly) on employment levels there. Derived
estimates of quantitative relationships are then applied to the specific London “global
city” case.
Framework of Analysis
Operationally, the analysis is framed in terms of a simple equilibrium model2 of
regional labor supply and demand for the quintile groups, applied to a panel data set for
the years 1976–2008 and the 10 NUTS1 regions of Great Britain. The region and quintile
sublabor markets are seen as related to each other and to an external world via sets of
spatial and occupational mobility processes.
The Basic Model
The basic model estimated for the bottom quintile (Q1) involved a supply/hourly
earnings equation and a demand/employment equation, taking the general form:
Supply: Wage in the quintile—related to employment in the quintile, international
migration (in gross and/or net terms), and house prices, plus spillovers from adjacent
quintiles and regions and differential impacts of the NMW.
Demand: Employment in the quintile—related to wages in the quintile, together with
employment or earnings in the higher-paid quintiles and other household characteristics
that have the potential to influence the substitution of marketed (but untraded) personal
services for self–servicing.
2 That is, one in which market-responsive wage levels tend to bring supply and demand into balance over some
period, although this balance may be continually disturbed by shocks from either side of the market.
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In each case, we specified a dynamic panel model, in log-linear form, with lagged
values of the dependent variable reflecting the likelihood of an extended adjustment
toward equilibrium earnings and employment, levels. With fixed effects, the two basic
equations are
W W W W L MigD NMWrt
q
rt
q
rt
q
r t
q
rt
q
rt rt
q
= + + + + +
−
±
± −γ γ γ γ γ γ1 1 2 1 3 1 4 5 1 6 + + + +γ ε7HP d drt rq tq rtq
(1)
L L W B Pop LD LD WHhldrt
q
rt
q
rt
q
rt rt
q
rt
d
r= + + + + +−β β β β β1 1 2 3 4 2 5 5 10 6: t rq tq rtqd d+ + + ε (2)
where L = (log) number of jobs, LD = (log) job density (as a proportion of the popu-
lation), W = log wages (hourly earnings), MigD = international migration (as a pro-
portion of the population), NMW = the expected direct impact of the NMW on (log)
earnings, HP = (log) average house prices, Pop = the (log) population, WHhld =
the proportion of fully employed working-age households, and d = a fixed effect.
The subscripts r and t refer to region and year, respectively, and superscripts to
(pay-ranked) quintiles or deciles of occupations (with 1 as the lowest); ±1 for r or
q refers to adjacent region(s) or quintiles and the parameters are all specific to a
quintile.
In the supply–earnings equation, we included a control for the NMW because its
impact was bound to be weaker in the high-cost regions of London and the southeast,
where fewer of those in the bottom tier of jobs had earnings below the level of it, as
initially set in 1999 or as uprated subsequently (Stewart 2002). In the demand/
employment equation, the proportion of all-worker households is included to reflect
constraints on these households’ potential for self-servicing, together with the employ-
ment (or total earnings) ratios for the higher quintiles and (as a more specific test of the
Friedman-Sassen hypothesis) for the top decile (D10) of jobs, most likely to demand
income- and education-elastic local services, such as child care, cleaning, and catering
(Manning 2004; Mazzolari and Ragusa 2007; Kaplanis 2010a). We estimated compa-
rable wage equations for each quintile to test hypotheses about the specific impact of
migration in the bottom quintile. We estimated the employment equation only for that
quintile, however, and hence omitted direct indicators of productivity, competitiveness,
and growth potential in the traded sectors.
Labor Mobility
Internal labor mobility, both between regions and quintiles, is treated here as entirely
endogenous. The regional distribution of international flows is, however, assumed to
contain substantial elements that are independent of the current state of regional labor
markets. One reason is that noneconomic factors have contributed substantially both to the
scale and the timing of the growth in immigration during the past 30 years, in the form of
refugee flows set in motion by internal conflicts elsewhere, shifting degrees of effective-
ness in UK immigration control (temporarily loosened in the late 1990s), and the
immediate opening up of UK borders to workers from the A8 countries of Eastern Europe
following their entry into the EU in 2004. The other is that the regional distribution of
immigrants within the United Kingdom has been heavily influenced by historic concen-
trations of particular national groups; a stronger perceived receptiveness of London (like
other world cities) toward foreign workers and refugees; governmental efforts after 2000
to counter these influences with a dispersal of asylum seekers; and the more targeted role
of private agencies in steering the recent A8 migrants toward (provincial) employers with
particular recruitment problems. Especially for those coming from “poor”/low-wage
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countries,3 these factors clearly matter much more than short–medium term fluctuations in
destination regions that scarcely affect the magnitude of the expected earnings differential
from their home countries.
In our model, immigration enters only into the supply equation because its effects on
the demand for untraded services are assumed to be mediated by the aggregate local
population level that is controlled for. Within the supply equation, its impact on wages
could be diluted by the induced migration of others to neighboring regions, of which
there is some evidence, although displacement is only partial and appears more of a
housing than a labor market phenomenon (Hatton and Tani 2005; Gordon et al., 2007).
Data Sources and Groupings
Data Sources
Data on hourly earnings and employment came from the UK Office of National
Statistics’s (ONS) New Earnings Survey (NES), an obligatory annual employer-based 1
percent survey of pay records. NES’s coverage of part-time workers with weekly pay
below the Pay asYou Earn tax threshold is known to be incomplete,4 as is that of recent job
changers—with recent investigations suggesting the latter to be substantially more impor-
tant (Pont 2007). Overall response rates have been tending to fall over time and probably
vary between regions. For this reason, trends in the size of quintile groups in a region are
graphed in terms of employment shares, while in the (log-linear) regression analyses, we
rely on region and year fixed effects to absorb variations in coverage and response rates.
The second key source is the ONS annual series of international migration estimates
for the UK regions, covering all kinds of movement into or out of the country involving
people intending to stay in or out for at least a year. These estimates derive primarily from
the port-based International Passenger Survey (IPS), which is supplemented from the
1990s on (in the Total International Migration series) with administrative information
about asylum seekers, flows to and from Ireland, and people switching between visitor
and migrant status. The IPS sample provides information on origins and destinations
within the United Kingdom, although with some adjustment in recent years to correct for
the reporting of initial London destinations by in-migrants who settled elsewhere. In the
figures derived from administrative sources, there is also some uncertainty about areas of
residence, with the regional allocation of asylum seekers for years prior to the introduc-
tion of a dispersal policy in 2000 apparently stemming from a one-off analysis of Home
Office files (for cases in 1983–91) that found 85 percent to be living in London
(Carey-Wood, Duke, Karn, and Marshall 1995). Despite such uncertainties (inherent in
this field), the data are the best available, the basis of all serious research, and involve no
predictable biases for analyses of the causal relations of interest here.
Our hypothesis about the effects of migration is primarily related to those coming from
low-wage countries. For the years before 1991, however, no breakdown by origin is
available at the regional level. Instead, because there is substantial continuity in the
pattern of regional destinations of particular types of migrants, we used a national
breakdown of flows between key types of migrants both to generate estimates of the
changing regional balance between migrants from rich and poor countries and to instru-
3 This category includes countries from the less developed global south, newly industrializing countries, and
the transition economies of Eastern and Central Europe.
4 Those in this category should still be covered, as long as their employers have other workers with pay above
the threshold and a common pay system, rather than separate, informal arrangements for casual staff (Pont
2007).
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ment the (known) total migration estimates for regions (which might not be independent
of local wage or employment changes). Four groups are distinguished, each with a
distinct regional distribution and big temporal shifts in their share: asylum applicants (as
counted by the Home Office), separating those arriving before or after the introduction
of dispersal policies in 2000; the A8 migrants arriving from mid-2004 on; and a residual
category of “mainstream” economic migrants (coming more or less equally from poor or
rich countries). The last group showed the smallest fluctuations and had a regional
pattern of destinations midway between the extremes represented by (predispersal)
asylum seekers who were heavily concentrated in London, and A8 migrants, who were
not. As we discuss in the next section, we used time-series regressions of regional
migration on these four types of flows both to instrument aggregate regional flows and to
generate estimates of the rich-poor country split within them.
Supplementary data on household/demographic characteristics—including a measure
of the proportion of workers living in households where all those of working age were
actually employed—were derived from the ONS’ General Household Survey (GHS),
supplemented by their Labor Force Survey (LFS) for missing years—both sources being
accessed online through the official Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS).
Geographic and Occupational Breakdowns
Our analysis, spanning the years 1976–2008, was conducted at the level of adminis-
trative regions of Great Britain. To overcome a major discontinuity in definitions during
the 1990s affecting those parts of the Greater South East, (GSE) outside London, these
parts were combined into a Rest of Greater South East (RGSE) region (consisting first of
the South East and East Anglia Standard Statistical Regions and then the Eastern and
South East Government Office Regions), leaving 10 regional units, among which London
is in a class of its own, both in agglomeration potential and in global city status. For the
distinction between types of jobs in relation to levels of human capital, we relied on the
NES classification of workers by occupation. These types were ordered and then grouped
into quintiles on the basis of hourly pay relativities (at the UK level), taken to reflect
market valuations of the range of (human capital) attributes required of workers in each.
The initial grouping was in terms of quintiles, with the bottom quintile (Q1) taken to
represent an “unskilled” category—now largely confined in the United Kingdom to work
in untradable activities (e.g., retailing, catering, hairdressing, and social care5), with high
shares of women and migrant workers. To represent the elite, agglomeration-sensitive
“professional” tier of cash-rich and time-poor workers, however, we chose the top decile
(D10), since their earnings were well above those in the next decile (by a third), as was
their concentration in Central London (with a quarter of the jobs).
The underlying occupational classification changed twice during our analysis period
(in 1991 and 2002), requiring rebenchmarking at the start of each period and a splicing
together of the subseries. To control for compositional shifts in the quintile groups in the
regression analyses, the regional fixed effects were interacted with separate dummy
variables for the three subperiods.
National Minimum Wage
The NMW variable represents an estimate of the expected proportional impact on a
region’s Q1 wage bill from compliance with the current NMW. This variable combines
5 For a listing of occupations in the bottom and top quintiles (using the three-digit Standard Occupational
Classification SOC90), see Kaplanis (2007).
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two sources of evidence. One (from the NES) is the ratio of the current (adult) NMW to
mean earnings in the region and quintile a year previously. The other (from the LFS) is
a regression-based estimate of the (nonlinear) relationship, estimated across regions or
conurbations, between the proportionate cost of compliance for Q1 at the initial (1999)
adult rate and the ratio of that rate to mean Q1 earnings in summer 1998 (a year before
the NMW first took effect). This regression took the form of a power function with the
proportionate impact estimated as 12.25 percent * MWR3.7 (where MWR is the ratio of
the NMW to mean hourly earnings in Q1). The weighted R2 of actual on predicted
impacts was 0.969.
Patterns and Trends in the Data
An initial perspective on the evidence can be gained simply by looking at time series
graphs of regional employment, real hourly wage levels for the top and bottom quintiles,
and net international migration relative to regional populations (see Figures 1–5). In each
case, London stands out clearly from the other regions, not only in terms of levels—with
the highest earnings levels for both quintiles, the highest share of jobs in D10, the lowest
in Q1, and the highest net migration ratio—but in the distinctiveness of its trends.
In terms of employment shares, in D10 (see Figure 1) the trend over the period as a
whole was broadly positive across the set of regions, although the evidence for this trend
is generally weak before about 1992. The takeoff in London seems slightly earlier (from
1990), and its growth thereafter was substantially faster. Its neighboring region, the
RGSE, which had the second-highest share of employment in D10 throughout, also
pulled further away from the others, although with less rapid growth than London.
In Q1 (see Figure 2), the employment trend was also upward in just about every region,
with some fluctuations common to most regions but no clear breaks in the trend. London
stands out in showing a slightly downward trend in the share of employment in this
quintile in the years up to about 1990—taking it from a point only slightly below the West
Midlands and RGSE to one a quarter lower. Beyond that point, the Q1 share in London
started to grow, increasing sharply between 1995 and 2000 and almost converging again
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Figure 1. Top decile job share.
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with that pair of regions. But then it fell back almost as much over the next five years,
while those in the other pair first held firm and then pulled further away, opening up an
even larger gap by 2008 than in the early 1990s. There is a suggestion at least of
symmetry in the trends between London, on the one hand, and the RGSE and West
Midlands, on the other hand, but London’s fluctuations were clearly distinct from those
in any other region and unrelated to any observed for the top decile. If simultaneous
growth in the shares of employment in the top and bottom groups is taken as evidence of
occupational polarization, there seems to have been a weak tendency of that kind across
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Figure 2. Bottom-quintile job share.
10
15
20
25
30
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
 London   Rest of Greater South East  
 South West   West Midlands  
 East Midlands   Yorkshire and the Humber 
 North West   North East  
 Wales   Scotland 
re
al
 h
ou
rly
10
 
Figure 3. Top-decile real hourly earnings (£s 2008 U.K. prices).
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the country as a whole from the 1990s, most clearly in the RGSE. In London itself,
however, that tendency seems true only between 1995 and 2000.
Graphs of change in real hourly earnings (deflated simply by a national cost of living
index) naturally show strong upward trends, with some short-term variation but little
evidence of substantial regional deviation from national patterns of change—except in
one case. In the top decile (see Figure 3) both London and (to a lesser degree) its regional
neighbors in the GSE seem to have grown faster than the other regions after about 1990,
although the difference was quite modest. In the bottom quintile (see Figure 4) there also
seems to have been little difference in earnings trends for nine of the regions. For
London, however, the trend in real earnings actually appears to have been downward
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Figure 4. Bottom-quintile real hourly earnings (£s 2008 UK prices).
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Figure 5. In-migration from overseas (population adjusted).
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during the 1990s, with the earnings gap between it and the RGSE closing rapidly
between 1994 and 2000 before partially reemerging during the next five years. These
trends will have been affected by the uneven regional impacts of the NMW. But since it
came in at a point (in 1999) when the Q1 pay gap between London and the RGSE had
already substantially closed and was stepped up (between 2003 and 2006) while the gap
was again opening up, it clearly was not responsible for the big swings in the relative
position of London Q1 earnings.
For gross migration from overseas (as a proportion of the population), national levels
were modest and relatively stable until the late 1980s, when they were subject to one
upward step, with another following a decade later. For most regions, there was little
change before 2000, when almost all of them showed an upturn (see Figure 5)—most
notably Yorkshire and the Humber, rising from a very low base to the second or third
highest position. Over the longer run, the RGSE remained above average both in rates of
inflow and their growth. But it is London that again stands out, with relative rates of
inflow initially about three times larger than in the rest of the country, then rising much
more steeply between 1994 and 2000, before falling back, while those in other regions
started to grow. The shifts in overall rates of inflow and in their regional distribution both
reflect the distinct developments for different types of inflow referred to earlier. In
particular, the boom in asylum seekers was heavily concentrated in London (with about
85 percent of the arrivals) until the enforcement of dispersal from 2000, while the A8
migrants mostly went elsewhere (including to Yorkshire and the Humber).
Regressions of regional arrival rates on national migration series for asylum seekers
(treating pre- and postdispersal cohorts separately), A8 migrants and “others” accounted
statistically for a high proportion of the variance (between 90 percent and 98 percent for
regions with substantial inflows, falling to about 80 percent for Wales and the North
(together receiving just 5 percent of the in-migrants). These regressions have been used
as the basis for both a synthetic set of regional estimates of inflows from rich and poor
countries and an instrument to control for potential endogeneity in migration levels in
analyses using this variable as a regressor6. It should be noted, however, that the addition
of measures of relative wage levels or change in employment to these equations did not
provide any significant evidence of substantive endogeneity of short- or medium-term
fluctuations in the regional pattern of arrivals. In the case of the Q1 measures, this
negative result contradicts Sassen’s (1991) assertion about the role of low-level job
growth in the global city region as the driver of its higher rate of in-migration.
This simple descriptive overview of trends points to the coincidence at least of some
major fluctuations between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, particularly affecting
London and involving migration together with the scale and earnings of bottom-tier
employment. Most notably, between 1995 and 2000, London experienced a distinctively
6 The measure of expected regional inflows that we used as an instrument for gross in-migration was the
predicted value for this inflow from a panel regression involving four national inflow variables (for
principal asylum seekers, pre- and post-2000, A8 migrants and all others) each interacted with regional
dummy variables. The first three components, which account for the bulk of the regional differences in
trends, are each largely the product of exogenous policy and political factors. A similar measure for net
migration was calculated from regressions including outflows as a fifth national variable. Synthetic
estimates of inflows from poor countries were derived from the gross migration regressions, using the
coefficients on A8 migrants and the two asylum seeker variables to predict the distribution of these flows
plus a constant share (54 percent, as nationally) of the “other” inward flow category. As an approach to
instrumenting regional migration rates, there are similarities with Card’s (2001) strategy, but differences
in the use of a policy-related (rather than geographic) split of national flows, and of regression (rather than
base-period flows) to determine weights.
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strong upsurge in immigration, coinciding with falling real earnings and increased
employment in the bottom quintile—all three shifts being largely reversed in the five
years that followed.
Estimation and Results
To examine the causal relationships more closely, we start by estimating a common set
of (supply-side) wage equations for each of the five quintiles to identify where within the
hierarchy of jobs international migration might actually have exerted a significant (pre-
sumably downward) effect on earnings. Having identified a significant negative effect
only within Q1, we then estimate a (demand-side) employment equation for this quintile
to test how far a lowering of wages, on the one hand, and a growth in the elite segment
of the regional workforce, on the other hand, can be expected to have an impact on jobs
in the lowest paid occupations. To check the robustness of the results, particularly in
relation to the impacts of migration on Q1 employment, we then estimate some aug-
mented and reduced-form employment equations. Finally, we translate the interregional
findings to the specific case of explaining the Q1 employment boom in London during
the late 1990s.
Wage Equations for the Five Occupational Quintiles
We estimated base runs of wage equations for each quintile on a dynamic panel basis,
including temporal and interquintile “lags” of the dependent variable, with an intendedly
robust measure of international migration based on gross inflows averaged over the two
preceding calendar years, expressed as proportions of the resident population. We tried
various forms of spatial lag in the dependent and independent variables experimentally
without success and excluded them from the base model, although we reexamined that
involving migrant inflows and Q1 wages with results reported next.
Two basic sets of estimates for the quintile wage equations are reported in Table 2,
one based on ordinary least squares (OLS) and the other on 3SLS. In the latter case,
current earnings and employment levels in each quintile are treated as endogenous, as
are international migration and house prices. In addition to the migration instrument
discussed in the previous section, instruments include two lags of other included vari-
ables and other demographic and labor market variables (drawn from the GHS). The
3SLS estimates also control for potential correlation of residuals across the five quintile
groups, including those that might arise from shared reactions to aggregate shocks
across a regional economy.
The reported R2 values in Table 2 indicate close fits for each of the regressions,
although this finding essentially reflects the power of the fixed effects, within what are
clearly highly integrated national labor markets, even in Q1, although especially for the
higher quintile groups. As is suggested by the time-series graphs for Q1 and Q5 (see
Figures 1 and 2), this integration has produced a rather stable pattern of regional differ-
entials, with time-specific influences (shocks and cycles) exerting similar effects across
all the regions. The fact that this is slightly less true in Q1 could reflect a lower spatial
mobility and/or the weakness of national wage bargaining in a poorly organized segment
of the labor market. Using separate time fixed effects for the northern and southern
regions to allow for weaker integration across this “divide” further reduces the residual
variance from the pure fixed-effects regressions (by about 20 percent) in all the quintiles
except Q5. Our failure, in the preliminary experiments, to find specific interdependences
with neighboring regions, is to be understood, then, not as pointing to an absence of
spillovers but, rather, to a strength that transmits effects (in terms of earnings if not
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Table 2
Average Earnings Regressions for Quintiles Across Regions and Years 1976–2008
Average Real Hourly Earnings (logged)
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
OLS
Wt−1 in quintile 0.473 0.366 0.273 0.471 0.324
(6.9) (4.3) (3.9) (7.4) (4.2)
Wt quintile above 0.273 0.362 0.153 0.087 ..
(3.2) (5.3) (2.1) (1.6)
Wt quintile below .. 0.185 0.453 0.218 0.305
(3.4) (5.5) (2.8) (3.8)
IntMigt−1 −2.397 0.932 −0.752 1.168 0.462
(3.2) (1.6) (1.2) (2.1) (0.6)
L in quintile −0.031 −0.047 0.013 0.020 0.058
(1.7) (2.7) (0.5) (1.0) (2.2)
HPt−1 0.030 0.011 −0.004 0.001 −0.016
(1.9) (0.8) (0.2) (0.1) (0.5)
Pot NMW impact 1.416 .. .. .. ..
(4.3)
Standard error (SE) 0.0088 0.0074 0.0083 0.0091 0.0128
R 2 0.9965 0.9981 0.9980 0.9986 0.9974
R 2 fixed effects + N/S interaction 0.9866 0.9924 0.9937 0.9964 0.9954
R 2 fixed effects only 0.9836 0.9904 0.9913 0.9954 0.9952
3SLS
Wt−1 in quintile 0.402 0.248 0.167 0.176 0.132
(3.8) (2.4) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8)
Wt quintile above 0.251 0.643 0.284 0.478 ..
(1.6) (3.1) (1.9) (3.8)
Wt quintile below .. 0.087 0.507 0.307 0.840
(0.5) (2.5) (2.0) (5.0)
IntMigt−1 −3.728 0.131 −1.393 1.529 −0.061
(2.8) (0.1) (1.4) (1.6) (0.1)
L in quintile −0.061 −0.054 −0.005 −0.018 0.081
(1.3) (1.6) (0.2) (0.6) (1.9)
HPt−1 0.061 0.016 −0.003 0.008 −0.038
(1.6) (0.8) (0.2) (0.3) (1.2)
Pot NMW impact 1.181 .. .. .. ..
(2.9)
SE 0.0074 0.0065 0.0070 0.0088 0.0116
Observations 320 320 320 320 320
Sources: NES and GHS microdata (from ONS Virtual Microdata Laboratory and ESDS, respectively) and the Department
of Communities and Local Government’s house price series.
Notes: Wage, employment, population, and house prices are all in log form. Bracketed values are t statistics based on
boot-strapped estimates of standard errors. Fixed regional and year fixed effects are included in all regressions; the
regional fixed effects are interacted with dummy variables for the periods covered by different occupational coding
schemes; the year effects are interacted with a north-south dummy variable. Employment in each quintile and the
international migration rate are treated as endogenous in the 3SLS estimates. Additional instruments used for these
estimates include one-year lagged values of employment in each of the quintile groups, exogenous variables from the
demand-employment equation, and an expected migration rate derived by regressing the actual numbers on national
immigration and asylum-seeking series interacted with regional dummy variables. 3SLS estimates are related to this set
of five equations estimated together.
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necessarily of employment rates) well beyond immediate neighbors, within the time
scale picked up by annual data series.
Among the more economically substantive control variables, contrasting patterns are
evident in the results for regional house prices (as the only available proxy for cost-of-
living differences) and for employment within the quintile (i.e., the effective labor
supply). For house prices, the only indication of a significant (positive) effect on earnings
is in Q1, and even there estimated elasticities (just 6 percent on the 3SLS estimate) are
much below the share of housing costs in total expenditures. At the top end (in Q5), there
is no sign of a positive effect on wages.
By contrast, employment within the quintile only ever shows the anticipated sig-
nificant positive relationship in Q5, while in the bottom two quintiles there is never a
sign of a positive relationship (or of significance). In general, the indications of an
elastic labor supply at the quintile and regional level are not inconsistent with evidence
about the high degree of openness of such disaggregated “submarkets.” From this
perspective, it does seem perverse that it should be only in what appears to be the most
spatially open segment of the labor market (Q5) that eliciting a larger supply of labor
in a specific region seems to require a significant increase in relative earnings. The
most plausible explanation is that a combination of high levels of specialization, a
continuously growing demand, and the monopoly power available to key workers with
firm-specific human and social capital has made this the least “perfect” of the broad
segments of the labor market.
For the NMW, the results bear out our expectations about its impact on regional
differentials in Q1 earnings. Our computed measure of the potential direct effect of
introducing the NMW involves average values for the years from 1999 of 4.3 percent
in London, compared with 6.7 percent across the rest of the country. The estimated
coefficient on this measure in the 3SLS estimates implies a relative increase in earnings
for areas outside London of 3 percent in the short term and 5 percent over the long
run.
For evaluation of the two hypotheses about the causes of the expansion of employ-
ment of the bottom quintile in the core (London) region, the key issue on the supply
side is whether earnings in this quintile show a distinctively strong negative impact
from overseas migration. On this point, the message from our quintile regressions is
pretty clear-cut, since there is significant evidence of such an effect only in Q1. In
most other quintiles, the parameter estimates are negative, but not significant. In Q4,
the relationship actually appears to be positive and possibly significant (at the 5 percent
level) in the OLS estimates. There is good support, then, for the hypothesis that the
negative effects of migration from overseas on wages are confined to the bottom tier
of jobs. But among these Q1 jobs, such migration does seem to be capable of depress-
ing wages substantially. The relevant parameter estimate from the (preferred) 3SLS
estimates imply that increasing the level of inflow by the equivalent of 1 percent of a
region’s population could be expected to reduce Q1 wages by nearly 4 percent in the
short run, rising to 6 percent in the longer run. The strength of this specific effect from
international migration contrasts with the evidence (just noted) that without migration,
Q1 employment can apparently be expanded significantly without any detectable
increase in average earnings.
To look more closely at the character of this Q1 pay-migration relationship, we
undertook a series of alternative regressions, focused on the time lags involved,
whether there was a symmetric effect from outflows, overspills from migration into
neighboring regions, and the specific significance of flows from poor countries. The
main results are reported in Table 3. These results suggest first (comparing columns
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1–6) that only the most recent inflow (in the calendar year preceding the spring-based
earnings survey) has an impact, and that rates of outflow are more or less irrelevant
(since the net migrant version fits less well and with much lower coefficient values).
The best-fitting model then simply involves the gross inflow into the region itself, in
the most recent period. Second, when an estimate of the split between poor- and rich-
country origins is introduced (column 7), it is clearly the former that exercises the
dominant influence, with an effect from rich-country arrivals that looks substantially
weaker and is not statistically significant. This finding is entirely consistent with our
hypothesis that the impacts of migration on Q1 regional earnings are most likely to
arise from the channeling of recent migrants from poor countries into such jobs—
rather than any cumulative effect on the balance of supply and demand.
Table 3
Average Earnings Regressions for the Bottom Quintile Across Regions and Years 1976–2008 with
Alternative Measures for International Migration
Migration Variable
Gross Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own Region
IntMigt−1 −4.321 −2.295 −4.491 −2.972 −4.262 −2.562
(2.9) (1.6) (3.4) (2.1) (2.3) (1.8)
IntMigt−2 0.585 0.779 0.442 0.786
(0.5) (1.0) (0.4) (1.1)
IntMigt−3 to t−5 (ave) 0.449 −1.743
(0.3) (1.5)
MigPoorCountryt−1 −3.232
(3.8)
MigRichCountryt−1 −1.246
(0.6)
Neighboring Regions
IntMigt−1 0.806 2.493
(0.4) (1.2)
IntMigt−2 0.896 0.558
(0.4) (0.3)
IntMigt−3 to t−5 (ave) −0.287 1.852
(0.1) (0.6)
Wt−1_Q1 0.331 0.449 0.347 0.456 0.338 0.450 0.411
(3.9) (6.5) (4.2) (5.1) (2.8) (5.3) (5.9)
Wt quintile above 0.269 0.206 0.231 0.200 0.231 0.213 0.187
(2.7) (2.5) (2.8) (2.1) (2.6) (1.8) (1.4)
L_Q1 −0.039 −0.045 −0.065 −0.069 −0.065 −0.064 −0.067
(1.0) (1.1) (1.9) (1.4) (1.4) (2.0) (1.8)
HPt−1 0.048 0.013 0.037 0.018 0.039 0.020 0.038
(1.8) (0.5) (1.8) (0.9) (1.4) (1.0) (2.0)
Pot NMW effect 1.162 1.559 1.293 1.535 1.223 1.553 1.381
(2.9) (3.9) (3.2) (4.4) (2.9) (3.7) (4.6)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280
SE 0.0094 0.0094 0.0094 0.0096 0.0093 0.0095 0.0091
Sources: as for Table 2.
Notes: see Table 2; all estimates here are based on 2SLS regressions, treating current employment and earnings in
quintiles as endogenous, together with own region migration in the most recent period; instruments are as in Table 2,
with the addition of an expected value for current net migration computed as for the gross migration instrument but
with reference also to a third national migration series for gross out-migration.
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A Demand-side Employment Equation for the Bottom Quintile
On the demand side, our baseline model concentrates on intra regional influences on
the untraded element of Q1 employment, starting with the aggregate local population
level and the mean wage/density of employment in Q1–Q4, but with particular interest
in its responsiveness to employment and earnings in the (“money-rich”) top decile, the
incidence of (“time-poor”) all-worker households, and the affordability of Q1 employees
in terms of hourly wages. Additional influences on the (smaller) traded component are
subsumed within the fixed effects, which again deal separately with the northern and
southern regions.
These hypotheses were tested, in a series of models reported in Table 4, generally as
single equations (estimated with instrumental variables ( IV)) but also finally with 3SLS
in the context of a full set of quintile wage and employment equations. Of the control
variables, there is confirmation (although with varying significance) of the positive
effects of (changing) population size and the employment–population ratio for the other
four quintiles, but not for their average earnings.
In relation to the variables of direct interest, there is support, if not always with
statistical significance, for a stronger positive effect from the employment ratio for the
top decile and (more tenuously) from a higher proportion of all-worker households. But
Table 4
Regressions of Employment in the Bottom Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b)
IV IV IV IV 3SLS
Lagged Emp Q1 0.438 0.504 0.494 0.480 0.419
(4.8) (7.5) (7.2) (6.8) (4.9)
W_Q1
In region
−1.211 −0.738 −0.597
(1.9) (1.4) (1.2)
In neighbors 0.468
(1.1)
Difference from neighbors −0.682 −0.732
(1.7) (2.2)
Pop 0.283 0.767 0.921 0.904 1.037
(0.7) (2.1) (2.3) (2.5) (4.1)
EmpDens Q2_5 0.326 0.139 0.094 0.147 0.272
(0.9) (0.6) (0.4) (0.6) (1.0)
W_Q2:Q5 −0.382
(0.7)
EmpDens D10 0.179 0.193 0.227 0.209 0.276
(1.2) (1.4) (1.4) (1.3) (1.9)
W_D10 −0.132
(0.3)
PropAllworkerHhld 0.076 0.098 0.094 0.095 0.093
(0.5) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.6)
N 320 320 320 320 320
R2 0.9969 0.9970 0.9970 0.9970 0.9970
SE 0.0272 0.0269 0.0268 0.0266 0.0218
Sources: as for Table 2
Notes: Equations also include a full set of fixed effect/interactions, as for the wage equations in Table 2. IV estimates are
for single equations, with endogenous variables and instruments as in Table 2. The 3SLS equations are from the
estimation of a set of wage and employment equations for each of the five quintiles. The R2 and SE values for a regression
with just fixed effects are 0.9908 and 0.0430; including the interaction between time and a north–south dummy variable
brings these values to 0.9921 and 0.0427.
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there is no evidence that increased earnings levels within the top decile add to the
demand for Q1 employment (see column 1). The strong indication that it is the size of the
elite group that matters, rather than its spending power, suggests that it may be the nature
of their tastes or lifestyles that boosts the demand for the untraded services supplied by
workers in Q1.
For the other key variable, the wage level within Q1 itself, the results consistently
support our expectation of a negative relationship, although not quite significant at 5
percent in the base run (column 1), and a bit weaker statistically when we removed the
other two wage variables, with insignificant and perversely signed coefficients (column
2). The estimated elasticity (of -0.74) is still strong, however, especially in relation to
the commonly reported finding that the NMW did not significantly lower employment
in this segment of the market, perhaps because the price effect was offset by new
efforts to improve competitiveness in the activities concerned (Metcalf 2008). That
finding held up even in the one study that looked at interregional differences (Stewart
2002). But whereas in Stewart’s NMW case, the spatial contrast was a broad north–
south one (between higher- and lower-cost regions), in our case more localized immi-
gration shocks produced some sharp contrasts in Q1 changes between neighboring
regions, both around London and around Yorkshire and the Humber. In these situa-
tions, even with nominally “untraded” kinds of services, there might have been spatial
switching of demand between nearby areas with significantly widening or narrowing
wage differences, particularly if there were established commuting, shopping, or vis-
iting flows between them.
To test this hypothesis, we added spatially lagged Q1 wages to the regression, yielding
a positive coefficient, which (although not formally significant) was of a similar scale to
the negative coefficient on the own region Q1 wage (column 3). Respecifying the wage
variable as a difference from that of neighbors strengthened its significance, although it
did not reach the 5 percent threshold on the IV estimates (column 4a), but passed it when
the equation was estimated with 3SLS as part of a full quintile system (column 4b). This
is our preferred version of the employment equation, with the lowest standard error, a
population coefficient with the unit elasticity that could be expected a priori, and the
clearest positive relationship with the D10 employment density.7
To test the robustness of these results and to derive direct estimates of the impact of
migration on Q1 employment, we ran a number of augmented regressions, including
both a saturated model (pooling variables from the supply and demand equations for
Q1) and a reduced-form Q1 employment equation (see Table 5). The results from the
former suggested that migration had no impacts on Q1 employment beyond those
mediated by (depressed) Q1 wages and an (increased) regional population. In line with
Metcalf’s (2008) analyses, however, there is a suggestion that the NMW might have
had other (positive) effects on Q1 employment that countered the negative one from
increased wage costs (column 1). Allowing the NMW variable to enter the demand
equation served only slightly to strengthen the significance of D10 employment
(columns 2 and 3).
In the reduced-form equation (columns 4–6), all three estimation methods point to
significant effects on Q1 employment from earnings in Q2 (negative in sign, reflecting
spillover effects on Q1 wages levels) and from Q1 earnings in the adjacent region
(positive, apparently reflecting price competition for locally traded services), as well
as from population levels (with elasticities of +1 or a bit lower). Consistent with
7 Estimates for the other quintile groups suggest a much weaker (negative) wage effect in Q2 and Q3 (with
none in Q4 or Q5) and no effect from D10 employment there (although positive ones again in Q4 and Q5).
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Sassen’s (1991) thesis, employment in the top cadre of jobs (D10) shows a consistently
positive effect (with elasticity estimates of 0.3 in each case, despite varying levels of
significance). There is also confirmation of an important effect from in-migration
rates, however—over and above that from its impact on population levels. In this case,
the coefficients vary quite a bit, with values between 2.5 and 4.6, compared with
that of 3.3 implied by our preferred 3SLS estimates for the relevant structural equa-
tions. Taking account of different parameter estimates on the lagged dependent vari-
ables, the estimated long-run effects are more or less identical—with values of about
8, implying an 8 percent increment in Q1 jobs from a regional inflow equivalent to 1
percent of the resident population—from both the structural and reduced-form 3SLS
estimates.
Implications for the London Case 1995–2005
Although this analysis has provided empirical support for both the growing demand
for the service class and migration from poor countries as significant positive influ-
ences on bottom-tier employment, the time-series evidence reviewed earlier suggests
that these influences had unequal relevance for the actual upturn in such jobs that
eventually materialized in London during the late 1990s (and partially reversed after
2000). In this context, what was striking was not any clear acceleration in the growth
of D10 jobs but, rather, the sharp upturn in immigration, accompanied by a lowering
of Q1 wages.
Table 5
Additional Regressions of Employment in the Bottom Quintile
Saturated
Augmented Demand
Equation Reduced Form
IV IV 3SLS OLS IV 3SLS
Lagged Emp Q1 0.458 0.456 0.452 0.452 0.452 0.470
(6.3) (5.6) (6.5) (7.9) (6.2) (8.1)
Wage_Q1
In region
−0.433
(2.1)
In neighbors 0.581 0.569 0.700 0.590
(1.5) (1.4) (2.1) (2.1)
Difference from neighbors −0.731 −0.768
(1.8) (2.8)
Pop 0.969 1.042 1.025 1.030 1.043 0.782
(2.8) (2.9) (2.7) (3.8) (4.0) (2.3)
EmpDens D10 0.314 0.281 0.419 0.281 0.311 0.340
(2.3) (2.0) (2.2) (5.0) (2.5) (1.9)
Wt quintile above −0.308 −0.547 −0.545 −0.762
(1.4) (2.8) (3.0) (3.2)
IntMigt−1 −0.140 4.590 2.462 4.259
(0.0) (1.9) (0.9) (2.0)
Pot NMW Effect 1.845 2.335 0.734 1.815 1.473 0.357
(1.0) (1.7) (0.6) (1.5) (1.0) (0.3)
N 320 320 320 320 320 320
R2 0.9970 0.9969 0.9967 0.9971 0.9969 0.9970
SE 0.0268 0.0269 0.0230 0.0266 0.0273 0.0222
Sources: as for Table 2.
Notes: See notes 1 and 2 to Table 4. The 3SLS estimates for the reduced form are estimated together with the
reduced-form employment equations for the other quintile groups.
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The relevant indicators of change for the period 1995–2000 are presented in Table 6,
comparatively for London and the average region. They show significant growth in D10
employment (by about 7 percent), but only modestly higher than in the average region,
whereas international migration in London surged ahead, much faster than elsewhere,
contributing to a population growth that was three times faster than nationally. Q1
employment in London appears to have grown by a full 20 percent over these 5 years
against zero change nationally. Applying the estimates of the long-run impact from the
3SLS reduced-form equation to the London differentials in growth rates for the inde-
pendent variables, it appears that about 8 percent of this 20 percent gap in Q1 growth
rates could be attributed to London’s higher in-migration rate, with a further 2 percent
from its faster population growth, against just 1 percent from a proportionately larger
increase in D10 jobs. Arithmetically, this is far from a complete accounting. But it is
sufficient to show that the upsurge of international immigration (particularly from poor
countries) into London over these years is much the more powerful of the two explana-
tory hypotheses in relation to this unique period of strong growth in bottom-tier jobs
within the capital-global city. It is also the only one that could explain the reversal of this
growth in the years after 2000, when in-migration abated or was diverted elsewhere.
Conclusions
In the late 1990s, London belatedly displayed the growth in low-paid service jobs that
was anticipated a decade earlier by proponents of the global cities hypothesis. But this
turned out to be a temporary phenomenon and primarily attributable to an influx of
migrants from poor countries, rather than to the demands of a burgeoning global service
class.
At its simplest, our findings (from British evidence) that inflows of such migrants into
a region tend to push wages down in the lowest-tier jobs and that a cheapening of labor
Table 6
Employment and Migration Changes 1995–2000: London Versus the British Regional Average
Employment and Migration Changes London
Average for
British Regions
Bottom quintile: share of all jobs
1995 16.1% 22.5%
2000 19.4% 22.5%
Percentage change 1995–2000 +20.5% 0.0%
Top decile job: population ratio
1995 5.21% 2.82%
2000 5.57% 2.97%
Percentage change 1995–2000 +6.9% +5.3%
Gross international migration: population ratio
1995 1.57% 0.49%
2000 2.75% 0.68%
Absolute change 1995–2000 +1.18% 0.19%
Population (millions)
1995 6.91 5.64
2000 7.24 5.72
Percentage change 1995–2000 +4.7% +1.5%
Sources: as for Table 2
Note: D10 job: population ratios average data for three years (1993–95 and 1998–2000) to smooth out annual response
variations.
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there can lead to a significant expansion of such jobs seem simply to reflect some
elementary economics, with an expanded supply serving to lower prices and thus raise
demand. The second part of this diagnosis is, however, at odds with the reported
insensitivity of employment in low-paid jobs to significant wage increases engendered by
the NMW.
Our results imply a more specific and nuanced process, however, in two respects. First,
it is not a simple accumulation of a growing supply of “unskilled” migrant labor that exerts
an increasing downward pressure on wages in bottom-tier jobs but, rather, the initial
channeling of (potentially skilled) new arrivals from poor countries into these jobs that
engenders a temporary downward pressure on wages in that tier. This is why a slowing of
the inflow (as in the later 2000s), rather than an actual reversal, was adequate to reduce that
pressure. It also helps to explain the localization of impacts within the region of arrival and
shifting pay differentials between neighboring regions. In turn, that links with the second
significant finding, namely, that pay differentials of this kind between neighbors are
capable of inducing significant spatial switches in the demand for personal services that
are locally tradable (e.g., through the mobility of customers)—even where a shared change
in wage levels does not affect the overall demand for these services.
Our basic conclusion for the London case—that the (real) boost to the demands for
personal services from an expanding professional elite (partly linked to global activi-
ties) would not have outweighed the negative influences on bottom-tier employment of
rising wage costs and domestic out-migration without the arrival of new waves of
in-migrants from poor countries—raises interesting comparative questions in relation
to the experience of other international cities to which the global city thesis has been
applied, although often challenged. These questions include how far migration into
New York City during the 1980s was the cause or consequence of the upsurge in
poorly paid service jobs that Sassen (1991) reported there. In the particular London
context, there are also important follow-up questions to be explored about the contri-
bution of depressed wages in this tier of its labor market from the late 1990s to an
observable upturn in voluntary worklessness8, in the years prior to the financial crisis
(Gordon et al. 2009).
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